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I. INTRODUCTION***
[1] The popularity and growth of online retailing, now in its tenth year,
has shattered experts’ expectations. “Online sales in the United States
grew twenty-four percent last year, to about $90 billion, and online
retailing now accounts for nearly five percent of all retail sales.”1
[2] This new sales channel brings new advertising opportunities; both
online retailers and traditional “brick and mortar” establishments2 have
flocked to the Internet to advertise their goods and services. In targeting
Internet consumers, retailers have sponsored individual websites and
placed virtual billboards, in the form of banner advertisements and pop*

Principal, Odin, Feldman & Pittleman, P.C., Fairfax, Virginia. B.S., 1994, University
of Virginia; J.D., 1997, University of Richmond School of Law.
**
Associate, Odin, Feldman & Pittleman, P.C., Fairfax, Virginia. B.A.S., 2000,
Georgetown University; J.D., 2005, University of Richmond School of Law.
***
Portions of this Article were presented by Jonathan D. Frieden as a part of a seminar
entitled “Legal Issues of the Online Retailer – Using Keyword Advertising in Internet
Marketing” sponsored by Lorman Education Services. Other portions of this Article
were published in conjunction with a seminar entitled “Legal Issues of the Online
Retailer in Virginia,” also through Lorman Education Services.
1
Leslie Walker, Surf’s Up on Web Shopping, WASH. POST, July 17, 2005, at F1. In
2004, nine companies had online sales exceed one billion dollars, with nine more
exceeding five hundred million dollars in online sales. Id. In all, “a total of 75 retailers
had online sales exceeding $100 million, and 208 had more than $20 million.” Id.
Amazon.com alone is expected to have net sales exceeding $8 billion this year. Antone
Gonsalves, Amazon Sales Up, Profits Down, INTERNETWEEK, July 26, 2005, available at
http://internetweek.cmp.com/news/166402777.
2
See Sharon Billington, Relief from Online Used Book Sales During New Book
Launches, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 497, 497 (2006).
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ups, throughout cyberspace.
They have used Internet-based
communications, such as e-mail and instant messaging, to advertise their
goods and services and have paid particular attention to the way Internet
users locate the goods and services in which they are interested.
[3] With these new opportunities come new risks as the law strives to keep
pace with the evolving use of technology for commercial transactions.
This Article is meant to touch on some of the legal issues attendant to
online sales and marketing and serve as a resource for online retailers and
consumers.
II. LIABILITY FOR SENDING UNSOLICITED ELECTRONIC MAIL
A. THE CAN-SPAM ACT OF 2003
[4] In 2003, Congress passed the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited
Pornography and Marketing Act, otherwise known as the CAN-SPAM Act
of 2003 (the “Act”),3 which prohibits the distribution of certain unsolicited
electronic mail, or “spam.”4 The Act imposes both monetary penalties and
incarceration upon violators5 but does not create a private cause of action
on the part of the recipient of spam.6
[5] The Act makes it a crime to send unsolicited commercial electronic
mail containing fraudulent header information and prohibits certain
methods of generating electronic mail address lists.7 The Act further
3

Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
7701–7713 (2003).
4
SPAM, in upper case letters, is spiced pork and ham and is the registered trademark of
Hormel Foods. On the other hand, the term “spam” in lower case letters is defined as “an
unsolicited, often commercial, message transmitted through the Internet as a mass
mailing to a large number of recipients.” MICROSOFT ENCARTA COLLEGE DICTIONARY
1383 (2001). The term “spam” is believed to derive from a comedy sketch performed by
the British comedy troupe Monty Python, where a group of Vikings chant the word
“spam” in a café which serves nothing but SPAM all day. See Monty Python’s Flying
Circus, Just the Words, Episode 25 (1970).
5
See 18 U.S.C. § 1037 (2003).
6
Instead, the Act is enforced by a combination of Federal Trade Commission
proceedings, criminal prosecution, state attorney general actions, and private lawsuits
brought by internet service providers. 15 U.S.C § 7706(b)–(f) (2003).
7
Id. § 7704(b); 18 U.S.C. § 1037 (2003).
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prohibits the transmission of commercial electronic mail to recipients who
have “opted out” of receiving such communications from the sender.8 It
also creates a regulatory scheme by which certain identifying information
is required in all commercial electronic mail and “directs the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) to develop a plan for implementing a national
Do-Not-E-Mail registry.”9 The Act is enforced through a combination of
criminal penalties, authorized civil actions by state authorities, FTC
action, and civil actions filed by Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”).10
1. CRIMINAL PENALTIES
[6] As stated in a recent New England Law Review article,
The CAN-SPAM Act criminalizes certain techniques
adopted by spammers to evade software filters and to
conceal their identities. Specifically, the Act outlaws five
methods of bypassing anti-spam technology. First, the Act
prohibits spammers from hacking into another person’s
computer, either by a password, or by means of software
installed on the remote computer via a Trojan Horse, and
sending spam from the remote computer’s Internet Protocol
(IP) address. Second, [the Act makes it a crime] to take
advantage of an “open" network server for the purpose of
relaying spam with the intent of deceiving ISP’s or
recipients as to the origin of the message. Third, spammers
may not materially falsify the header information on
multiple commercial e-mail messages. Fourth, the statute
bans the practice of creating multiple e-mail accounts or
domain names, or using information that materially falsifies
the identity of the registrant, for the purpose of sending
multiple unsolicited commercial e-mails. Finally the Act
prohibits falsely representing oneself as the authorized user

8

15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(4).
Adam Hamel, Note, Will the Can-Spam Act of 2003 Finally Put a Lid on Unsolicited EMail?, 39 NEW. ENG. L. REV. 961, 976 (2004) (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 7704(b), 7708).
10
15 U.S.C. § 7706 (b)–(f) (2003).
9
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of a block of IP addresses for the purpose of using those
addresses for the transmission of spam.11
[7] According to 18 U.S.C. § 1037, distributors of spam may be fined and
imprisoned for up to five years if the violation was committed in
“furtherance of a felony,”12 or if the defendant had previously been
convicted of sending spam either under the Act or any state law.13 A court
may impose either a fine, imprisonment of up to five years, or both,14 if
the offense involves: (1) access to a computer without authorization and
intentionally sending spam from it; (2) twenty or more falsified e-mail
accounts; (3) ten or more false domain names; (4) a volume of messages
exceeding 2,500 during any twenty-four hour period, 25,000 during any
thirty-day period, or 250,000 during any one-year period; (5) causing loss
to one or more persons aggregating $5,000 or more during any one-year
period; or (6) the concerted action of the defendant with three or more
other persons organized or led by the defendant.15
2. STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL ACTIONS
[8] When a state attorney general or an official of a state agency has
reason to believe that the residents of his or her state are being harmed or
threatened by certain violations of the Act, he or she may bring a civil
action on behalf of those residents.16
Any state authority suing under the Act must first notify the
FTC . . . and the FTC has a right to intervene in any action
brought by a state authority. Also, no state actor may bring
an action against a defendant named in an action brought
by the FTC while that [FTC] action is pending.17

11

Hamel, supra note 9, at 979–80.
18 U.S.C. § 1037(b)(1)(A) (2003).
13
Id. § 1037(b)(1)(A)–(B) (2003).
14
Id. § 1037 (b)(1).
15
Id. § 1037(b)(2)(A)–(F).
16
15 U.S.C. § 7606(f)(1) (2003).
17
Hamel, supra note 9, at 988.
12
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3. PRIVATE ACTIONS BY INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS
[9] Under the Act, an Internet Service Provider who has been adversely
affected by violations listed in Section 770418 may bring a civil action
seeking injunctive relief or damages for either: (1) the actual monetary
loss suffered by the provider or (2) statutory damages as set out in the
Act.19 If the violations of the Act were committed willingly and
knowingly, or if the violation included harvesting email addresses or the
automatic creation of electronic mail addresses, the court may treble the
damages awarded.20
B. VIRGINIA STATE LAW
[10] The Act “supersedes any statute, regulation, or rule of a state or
political subdivision of a state that expressly regulates the use or
transmission of spam, except to the extent that any such state, regulation,
or rule prohibits falsity or deception in any portion of spam or information
attached thereto.”21 The Act does not, however, pre-empt state laws that
are not specific to spam, “including state trespass, contract, or tort law.”22
Similarly, it does not pre-empt states laws that “relate to acts of fraud or
computer crimes.”23
[11] For instance, Virginia Code Section 18.2-152.3:1, which prohibits the
knowing falsification of “electronic mail information or routing
information” and the sale or other distribution of software intended to
falsify such information,24 is not pre-empted. This statute prohibits such
conduct where
18

18 U.S.C. §7704 (2001).
15 U.S.C. § 7706(g) (2003).
20
Id. § 7706(f)(3)(c).
21
15 U.S.C. § 7707(b)(1) (2003).
22
Id. § 7707 (b)(2)(A).
23
Id. § (b)(2)(B). Virginia has specifically recognized that under certain circumstances,
the transmission of unsolicited bulk e-mail (i.e., spam) through a computer system can
constitute the tort of trespass to chattel. See, e.g. America Online v. LCGM, 46 F. Supp.
2d 444, 451–52 (E.D. Va. 1998). For a good discussion of the effects of and remedies to
spam, see generally Dianne Plunkett Latham, Spam Remedies, 27 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1649 (2001).
24
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.3:1 (2004).
19
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(1) the volume of mail transmitted exceeds 10,000
attempted recipients in any twenty-four hour period,
100,000 attempted recipients in any thirty-day period, or
1,000,000 attempted recipients in any one-year period, or
(2) the revenue generated from a specific mail transmission
exceeds $1,000 or the total revenue generated from all mail
transmitted to any electronic mail service provider exceeds
$50,000.25
Violators are guilty of a Class 6 Felony as are those who knowingly hire,
employ, use, or permit any minor to assist in the transmission of
unsolicited bulk electronic mail as described in the statute.26
III. KEYWORD ADVERTISING AND POTENTIAL LIABILITY FOR
TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT
A. UTILITY AND METHODS
[12] Early on, online marketers’ focus on the way users of the Internet
located the goods and services in which they were interested guided
companies’ choices of domain names, leading some retailers to adopt the
trademarks of competitors as domain names or use those marks within the
hidden code generating their websites.27 Now, as Internet users have
become more sophisticated, online retailers target consumers using the
same search engines those consumers use to find information on the
Internet.
1. SEARCH MARKETING
[13] Internet search engines, such as Google and Yahoo assist users in
locating specific websites by displaying a list of sites that contain search
terms or keywords entered by the user. Search engines create this list of
websites using an algorithm to process and match the user-defined
25

Id.
Id.
27
Such practices have been forbidden by federal legislation. See, e.g., Melissa Klipp &
Michael Zogby, Caveat Venditor: Using a Competitor Brand to Drive Traffic to Your
Site, 14 N.J. LAW.: WKLY. NEWSPAPER, May 16, 2005, at A8.
26
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keywords to text on various sites, ordinarily listing links to these websites
in order of decreasing relevance to the user’s search.28 The order in which
the listed websites appear takes on particular importance in light of the
view that “only the top few sites on the . . . [search results page] will be
visited by [search engine] users.”29 Accordingly, aggressive online
marketing techniques often focus on increasing the likelihood that a
specific website will appear near the top of the search results generated.
[14] Online retailers typically use two methods to increase their visibility
to search engine users: (1) search engine optimization and (2) keyword
advertising.30 Search engine optimization involves an analysis of the
software used by search engines “in order to ‘tweak’ a website so that it
Such
comes as high up” on a search results page as possible.31
optimization often includes the use of particular terms in the hidden text of
the website code32 known as “metatags.”33 Keyword advertising, or
“keying,” “involves identifying the main keywords people type in when
searching the Web and ‘buying’ those keywords deemed most likely to
lead consumers to the [advertiser’s] website.”34
[15] Used properly, search marketing can directly increase the number of
visitors to, and sales by, a particular website.35 The power of search
advertising is evidenced by the fact that it has spawned an entirely new
28

Id.
Id.
30
Special Report – Online: Search and Ye Shall Find, MARKETING WK., Jan. 20, 2005, at
43.
31
Id.
32
Id.
[M]arketers can “hijack” users searching for rivals’ brand names in
various ways. For example, a website for Company A could hide
Company B’s brand names or advertising slogans in the underlying
computer code [for Company A’s website]. While ordinary [Web]
surfers never see this code, the software the search engines use to
catalogue the Web do: so Company A’s site will be deemed to be more
‘relevant’ [to the surfer’s search] despite actually pushing rival brands.
Id.
33
See Terrell W. Mills, Seeking to Evade User Detection and the Lanham Act, 6 RICH.
J.L. & TECH. 22, *3 (2000).
34
Id.
35
Id.
29
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Internet-based industry whose focus is helping online retailers maximize
their visibility to consumers who use Internet search engines.36
2. KEYWORD ADVERTISING
[16] Keyword advertising is a growing marketing method for online
retailers and a growing revenue source for Internet search engines.37 The
success of keyword advertising, coupled with aggressive marketing
approaches involving the use of trademarks owned by competing
businesses, has resulted in a recent flood of litigation testing the
application of traditional trademark principles to this new form of
advertising.38 It is imperative that online retailers appreciate not only the
value of keyword advertising but also the potential legal exposure
attendant to its use.
[17] The power of keyword advertising as a marketing tool and its position
as the leading revenue generator among Internet search engines has led to
a noticeable increase in its use.39 A majority of the most popular Internet
search engines, including Google and Yahoo, offer this sort of “paid
placement” advertising program in which advertisers are permitted “to
purchase search terms, which either trigger the advertiser’s site to appear
at the top of a [search results page], . . . highlight a link to the site as a
sponsored or featured ad,” or display the advertiser’s banner
advertisement.40 As explained in a recent article, “[t]he process is simple:
advertisers bid on and purchase those search terms that they believe will
attract the most users to their sites. Such search terms can be descriptive
words, product names or, in some instances, the brand names [or
trademarks] of a competitor.”41
36

Websites such as “http://www.searchenginerankingservice.com” advertise relationships
with hundreds of thousands of Internet search engines and offer to assist online retailers
in increasing the visibility of their website.
37
See Sarah J. Givan, Using Trademarks as Location Tools on the Internet: Use in
Commerce? 2005 UCLA J. L. & TECH. 4 (2005).
38
Id.
39
See, e.g., Michelle Kaiser Bray, Search Engine Practices Create Intriguing Legal
Issues, INDIANAPOLIS BUS. J., April 26, 2004, at 25 (“According to some analysts, the
[keyword advertising] . . . business accounts for nearly 75 percent of search engine
revenue, a figure likely to exceed $2 billion this year [2004].”).
40
Klipp, supra note 27, at A8.
41
Id.
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B. GENERAL TRADEMARK CONCEPTS
1. TRADEMARK LAW
[18] A trademark is “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof . . . used by a person, or . . . [intended for use in
commerce] . . . to identify and distinguish his or her goods . . . from those
manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods,
even if that source is unknown.”42 As explained by Professor Kurt
Saunders, “a trademark serves as an indicator of source for consumers,
allowing them to associate the product with its manufacturer.”43 By
indicating the source of goods, trademarks also serve as an indicator of
quality and may serve as an indicator of sponsorship or authorized
distribution.44
[19] The Lanham Trademark Act provides federal protection for both
registered and unregistered trademarks,45 with the greatest protection
being afforded to highly distinctive marks.46 The Lanham Act prohibits
both infringement and dilution, permitting trademark owners to obtain
injunctions, and in some cases monetary damages, for the improper use of
their marks.47

42

15 U.S.C. §1127 (2000).
Kurt M. Saunders, Confusion is the Key: A Trademark Law Analysis of Keyword
Banner Advertising, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 543, 546–47 (2002).
44
Id.
45
Saunders, supra note 43, at 547 (citations omitted) (discussing 15 U.S.C. § 114
(2001)). The Lanham Trademark Act provides protection for registered trademarks (15
U.S.C. § 1051, et seq.) and unregistered trademarks (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2000).
However, trademark owners who register their trademarks in accordance with the federal
statute are afforded additional benefits not provided to the owners of unregistered marks.
“Federal registration of a trademark creates a presumption of validity, ownership, and the
right to use the mark, and allows the owner to prevent importation of products into the
United States that may infringe the mark.” Saunders, supra note 43, at n. 29.
46
Saunders, supra note 43, at 547–49 (“Trademarks are classified in the order of their
increasing distinctiveness: generic, descriptive, suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful. The
more distinctive the mark, the greater protection afforded by law.”).
47
Id. at 547–48.
43
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2. TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT
[20] Under the Lanham Act, “any person who shall, without the consent of
the registrant use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or
colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale,
offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or
in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive” can be found liable for trademark infringement.48
Thus, to prevail on such a claim, a trademark owner must demonstrate
that: (1) it has a valid trademark, entitled to protection under the Lanham
Act; (2) the infringer used the mark; (3) the infringer’s use of the mark
was in connection with the sale or advertising of goods or services; (4) the
infringer’s use of the mark occurred in commerce; (5) the infringer’s use
of the mark was likely to cause confusion as to the affiliation, connection,
or association of the infringer with the trademark owner, or as to the
origin, sponsorship, or approval of the infringer’s goods, services, or
commercial activities by the trademark owner; and (6) the infringer’s use
of the mark was without the consent of the trademark owner.49
3. UNFAIR COMPETITION
[21] The Lanham Act also affords protection to unregistered trademarks,
imposing liability for unfair competition where a person

48

15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2000).
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2000). To establish likelihood of confusion, the trademark
owner,

49

must show that there exists a likelihood that an appreciable number of
ordinarily prudent purchasers are likely to be confused as to the source
or sponsorship of the goods or services in question. The test for
determining likelihood of confusion involves a weighing of factors,
including the following: (1) the strength of the plaintiff’s mark; (2) the
degree of similarity between plaintiff’s and defendant’s marks; (3) the
proximity of the products; (4) the likelihood that plaintiff will bridge
the gap; (5) actual confusion; (6) defendant’s good faith in adopting the
mark; (7) the quality of defendant’s product; and (8) the sophistication
of the buyers.
Saunders, supra note 43, at 549–50.

10

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIII, Issue 2

uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or
device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation
of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or
misleading representation of fact which . . . is likely to
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person
without another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or
approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial
activities by another . . . .50
The tests for infringement of registered and unregistered marks are nearly
identical.
4. TRADEMARK DILUTION
[22] The Lanham Act protects trademarks from dilution, as well as
infringement. Dilution “refers to the decreased capacity of a famous mark
to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of competition
between the parties or likelihood of confusion.”51
Trademark dilution usually takes the form of “blurring” or
“tarnishment.” Blurring occurs where consumers
mistakenly associate the famous mark with goods and
services of another’s mark, thereby weakening the power of
the famous mark owner to identify and distinguish its
goods and services. . . . By contrast, tarnishment occurs
“where an accused, junior mark is used on unwholesome or
inferior goods or services that may [degrade or] create a
negative association with the goods or services protected by
the famous mark.”52
In determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous, the federal
dilution statute outlines eight factors for courts to use, along with other
relevant factors:
50

15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2000).
Saunders, supra note 43, at 550.
52
Id. (citing THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 3:4 (4th ed. 2001)).
51
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the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of
the mark;
the duration and extent of use of the mark in
connection with the goods or services with which
the mark is used;
the duration and extent of advertising and publicity
of the mark;
the geographical extent of the trading area in which
the mark is used;
the channels for trade for the goods or services with
which the mark is used;
the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading
areas and channels of trade of the mark’s owner and
the [adverse party];
the nature and extent of use of the same or similar
marks by third parties; and
whether the mark was registered . . .53
C. TRADEMARK ANALYSIS OF KEYWORD ADVERTISING
1. OVERVIEW OF THE SEMINAL CASES

A) PLAYBOY ENTERPRISES, INC. V. NETSCAPE COMMUNICATIONS
CORPORATION

[23] The earliest case involving keyword advertising adjudicated54 in the
United States was Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications
Corp., decided by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 2004.55 The
defendants in Playboy used various lists of keywords to which they keyed
advertisers’ Internet banner advertisements. The specific list at issue in the
case contained a variety of terms related to sex and adult-oriented
entertainment, including the terms “playboy” and “playmate,” for which
53

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000).
Two of the earliest trademark cases involving keyword advertising were settled without
adjudication. See Saunders, supra note 43, at 558 (citing Estee Lauder Inc. v. Fragrance
Counter, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Innovator Corp.,
105 F. Supp. 2d 816 (S.D. Ohio 2000)).
55
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp. 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004).
54
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Playboy Enterprises, Inc. (“PEI”) holds trademarks.56
Defendants
required adult-oriented companies to link their advertisements to this set
of terms so that when Internet surfers entered certain search terms such as
“playboy,” or “playmate,” the search results page would display the
defendants’ banner advertisements.57
On the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment,
PEI introduced evidence that the adult-oriented banner ads
displayed on defendants’ search results pages are often
graphic in nature and are confusingly labeled or not labeled
at all. In addition, the parties do not dispute that buttons on
the banner ads say “click here.” When a searcher complies,
the search results page disappears, and the searcher finds
him or herself at the advertiser’s website.58
Moreover, PEI introduced uncontroverted evidence that defendants used
“click rate” statistics, measuring the “ratio between the number of times
searchers click on banner ads and the number of times the ads are
shown”59 to persuade paying advertisers to renew their keyword
advertising contracts.60 The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the defendants.61
[24] On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed both PEI’s trademark
infringement and dilution claims. As to the infringement claim, the court
noted that PEI’s strongest argument for likelihood of confusion was for a
specific type of confusion known as “initial interest confusion.”62 As
explained by the court, “[i]nitial interest confusion is customer confusion
that creates initial interest in a competitor’s product. Although dispelled
before an actual sale occurs, initial interest confusion impermissibly
capitalizes on the goodwill associated with a mark and is therefore
actionable trademark infringement.”63
56

Id. at 1023.
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 1024.
63
Id. at 1025.
57
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[25] The court noted that “the ‘core element of trademark infringement,’
the likelihood of confusion,” was central to the determination of whether
the defendants had infringed PEI’s trademarks.64 In applying the Ninth
Circuit’s eight-factor test originally described in AMF v. Sleekcraft Boats
to determine likelihood of confusion,65 the court explained that, in the
Internet context, “courts must be flexible in applying the factors, as some
may not apply” and specifically recognized “that some factors are more
important than others.”66
[26] In reviewing the record in light of the Sleekcraft factors, the court
determined that factors one, two, three, four, six, seven, and eight favored
PEI’s position,67 and factor five was “equivocal” but merited “little
weight.”68 Accordingly, the court determined that a genuine issue of
material fact existed as to the substantial likelihood of confusion and
denied summary judgment on the “fair use” defense asserted by the
defendants.69
[27] In examining PEI’s dilution claim, the court found that PEI had
established a genuine issue of material fact as to each disputed
requirement of its claim: (1) the famousness of the subject marks; (2) the
commercial use of the marks by defendants; and (3) the dilution of the
distinctive quality of the marks.70 Accordingly, the circuit court reversed
64

Id. at 1024 (noting that no dispute existed “regarding the other requirements set forth
by the statute: PEI clearly holds the marks in question and defendants used the marks in
commerce without PEI’s permission”).
65
AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979). The eight factors
are: (1) strength of the mark; (2) proximity of the goods; (3) similarity of the marks; (4)
evidence of actual confusion; (5) marketing channels used; (6) type of goods and the
degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser; (7) defendant’s intent in selecting
the mark; and (8) likelihood of expansion of the product lines. Id.
66
Playboy Enterprises, 354 F.3d at 1026 (“For example, a showing of actual confusion
among significant numbers of consumers provides strong support for the likelihood of
confusion.”).
67
Id. at 1026–29.
68
Id. at 1028.
69
Id. at 1029. In separate analyses, the court also denied defendants summary judgment
on their nominative use and functional use defenses. Id. at 1029–31.
70
Id. at 1031–33. The trial court rendered its decision before the Supreme Court clarified
the standard for withstanding summary judgment on dilution claims in Moseley v. V
Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
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the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants and
remanded the matter for further proceedings.71
B) THE EARLY WHENU.COM

CASES

[28] Though not directly involving keyword advertising programs,
reported opinions pertaining to WhenU.com, Inc.’s Internet “pop-up”
advertising program formed the basis for many later keyword advertising
decisions. Three WhenU.com cases are worthy of note, with the first two
being decided before a series of Google keyword advertising decisions
that have helped to refine the analysis of these issues.72
(1) WELLS FARGO & COMPANY. V. WHENU.COM, INC.
[29] In Wells Fargo & Company v. WhenU.com, Inc., the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan reviewed the online
“contextual marketing”73 program of WhenU.com, Inc. (“WhenU”) in the
context of the plaintiff’s complaint alleging trademark infringement and
its motion for preliminary injunction.74 WhenU delivers its online
“contextual marketing” to computers via “SaveNow,” its proprietary
software product.75 SaveNow delivers “contextually relevant advertising
at the moment the consumer demonstrates an interest in the product or
service, without any knowledge of the consumer’s past history or personal
characteristics” based on the consumer’s Internet browsing activity.76
Relevant advertisements are then delivered directly to the consumer’s
computer screen, or “desktop.”77

71

Playboy Enterprises, 354 F.3d at 1034.
Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734 (E.D. Mich. 2003); UHaul Int’l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723 (E.D. Va. 2003); 1-800
Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005).
73
Wells Fargo & Co., 293 F. Supp. 2d at 738 (“Contextual marketing technology
endeavors to market products and services to consumers who have a demonstrable
interest in those products and services . . . . Traditionally, contextual marketing has been
conducted by assembling large databases containing a wide variety of personal
information about individual potential customers and their past purchasing behavior.”).
74
Id. at 736.
75
Id. at 738.
76
Id.
77
Id.
72
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[30] WhenU sells its advertising on the basis of “sales categories, which
are grouped into certain product and service categories.”78
The
Advertising Operations team at WhenU receives a creative copy of an
advertisement from an advertiser, then “maps” the advertisement “by
determining the various categories . . . and keyword algorithms that will
trigger the appearance of the advertisement, subject to priority and
frequency limitations.”79 The data is then recorded in the WhenU
Directory (the “Directory”), which is delivered to and saved on a
participating consumer’s desktop.80
[31] As provided in the court’s decisions,
As a participating consumer browses the Internet, the
SaveNow software studies the user’s browsing activity and
compares it against the elements contained in the Directory.
Simultaneously, the SaveNow software determines
whether: (a) any of those elements are associated with a
category in the Directory, and (b) whether those categories
are associated with particular advertisements. If the
software finds a match, it identifies the associated product
or service category, determines whether appropriate ads are
available to be displayed, and, if so, selects an ad based on
the system’s priority rules, subject to internal frequency
limitations.81
[32] The advertisements displayed by SaveNow are displayed in
“conspicuously branded” windows, specifically indicating that they are
provided by WhenU and are not sponsored by any website the Internet
user may be seeing.82 The advertisements do not display any trademarks
other than those owned by WhenU or the advertiser.83 Web addresses and
search terms are included in the Directory but are used only as an indicator
of consumer interest.84
78

Id. at 744.
Id. at 743.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 745.
83
Id. at 746–48.
84
Id. at 743.
79
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[33] After a review of the specific evidence presented in the case, the
Wells Fargo court determined that WhenU had made no “use” of the
plaintiff’s trademarks under the Lanham Act.85 In particular, the court
noted that
WhenU does not use any of plaintiffs’ trademarks to
identify goods or services, to indicate any sponsorship or
affiliation with the goods or services advertised by WhenU,
or to identify the source or origin of any goods or services
advertised by WhenU.86
[34] The court also found that plaintiffs had failed to submit competent
evidence of likelihood of confusion from the SaveNow advertisements,
stating that there was “good reason to believe that the typical SaveNow
user would not perceive a WhenU advertisement as sponsored or affiliated
with the plaintiffs’ websites.”87 In coming to this conclusion, the court
noted that: (1) participating consumers are “accustomed to receiving
offers from WhenU while surfing the Web”; (2) the advertisements
produced by SaveNow are conspicuously labeled as originating from
WhenU, with a disclaimer that they are not sponsored or affiliated with the
website being viewed by the consumer; and (3) SaveNow advertisements
appear in a separate window, “bear all of the indicia of a distinct software
application, and do not relate in any way to any other window on the
user’s screen.”88
(2) U-HAUL INTERNATIONAL, INC. V. WHENU.COM, INC.
[35] In the fall of 2003, around the same time as the Wells Fargo decision,
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia was
deciding U-Haul International, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc.89 In ruling on

85

Id. at 769.
Id. at 747 (“The use of keyword terms in connection with the delivery of
advertisements is a common practice on the Internet, and is a source of revenue for search
engines such as Google, and other Internet companies.”).
87
Id. at 749.
88
Id. at 749–50.
89
U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723 (E.D. Va. 2003).
86
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cross motions for summary judgment, the U-Haul court reviewed the same
SaveNow software at issue in Wells Fargo.90
[36] The court granted summary judgment for WhenU, holding that
SaveNow made no impermissible “use” of plaintiff’s trademarks.91 In
particular, the U-Haul court pointed out that
“use” is not established merely because trademarks are
simultaneously visible to a consumer. Such comparative
advertising does not violate trademark law, even when the
advertising makes use of a competitor’s trademark. . . .
Thus, the appearance of WhenU’s ads on a user’s computer
screen at the same time as the U-Haul web page is a result
of how applications operate in the Windows environment
and does not consist of “use” pursuant to the Lanham Act.92
The court further found that WhenU’s inclusion of the U-Haul web
address and trademark “U-Haul” in the Directory did not constitute “use in
commerce” under the Lanham Act because neither the web address nor the
trademark were displayed to consumers, but were only used internally, by
the SaveNow software.93
C) THE GOOGLE CASES
[37] The success and visibility of Google’s keyword advertising program
has made it a recent target of trademark litigation in various courts around
the world. The United States cases involving Google help shed some light
on the current state of trademark law as it is applied to keyword
advertising.

90

Id. at 724–25.
Id. at 729.
92
Id. at 728 (citations omitted).
93
Id. at 727.
91
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(1) GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY V. GOOGLE, INC.
[38] In Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Google, Inc.,94
Government Employees Insurance Company (“GEICO”) filed an eightcount complaint against defendants Google and Overture alleging
trademark infringement, contributory trademark infringement, vicarious
trademark infringement, false representation, and dilution under the
Lanham Act95 based upon the “defendants’ use of GEICO trademarks in
selling [keyword] advertising on defendants’ Internet search engines.”96
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)97 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, asserting, among other arguments, that
the defendants’ use of the GEICO trademarks did not occur “in
commerce” or “in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution,
or advertising of goods and services.”98
[39] In ruling on the motion to dismiss, the court first outlined the
elements of trademark and unfair competition claims before reviewing the
authorities cited by each party.99 Among other authorities, defendants
cited to U-Haul to support their proposition that their use of the GEICO
trademarks was not a “trademark use of those marks under the Lanham
Act.”100 In opposing the motion to dismiss, GEICO focused on cases
reaching the opposite conclusion, such as Playboy and the district court
opinion in 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com,101 and directed the court to

94

Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. Google Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700 (E.D. Va. 2004).
15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2000).
96
Gov’t Employees Ins. Co.,330 F. Supp. 2d at 701.
97
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
98
Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. 330 F. Supp. 2d at 702.
99
Id. (“A plaintiff alleging causes of action for trademark infringement and unfair
competition must show 1) that it possesses a mark; 2) that the defendant used the mark;
3) that the defendant’s use of the mark occurred ‘in commerce’; 4) that the defendant
used the mark ‘in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising’
of goods and services; and 5) that the defendant used the mark in a manner likely to
confuse customers.”).
100
Id. at 703.
101
1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), rev’d
414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005); see also infra § III(C)(1)(d).
95
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decisions holding that the use of trademarks in metatags “constitute a use
in commerce under the Lanham Act.”102
[40] The court viewed the authorities cited by GEICO as better reasoned
and denied the motion to dismiss as to GEICO’s federal claims, stating
that
[t]he complaint clearly alleges that defendants use
plaintiff’s trademarks to sell advertising, and then link that
advertising to results of searches. Those links appear to the
user as “sponsored links.” Thus, a fair reading of the
complaint reveals that plaintiff alleges that defendants have
unlawfully used its trademarks by allowing advertisers to
bid on the trademarks and pay defendants to be linked to
the trademarks.103
The court further noted that,
defendants’ offer of plaintiff’s trademarks for use in
advertising could falsely identify a business relationship or
licensing agreement between defendants and the trademark
holder. In other words, when defendants sell the rights to
link advertising to plaintiff’s trademarks, defendants are
using the trademarks in commerce in a way that may imply
that defendants have permission from the trademark holder
to do so. This is a critical distinction from the U-Haul case,
because in that case the only “trademark use” alleged was
the use of the trademark in the pop-up software – the
internal computer coding. WhenU allowed advertisers to
bid on broad categories of terms that included the
trademarks, but did not market the protected marks
themselves as keywords to which advertisers could directly
purchase rights.104
102

Gov’t Employees Ins. Co.330 F. Supp. 2d at 703 (citing Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp.
2d 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Playboy Enters. Inc. v. Aisia Focus Int’l, No. Civ.A. 97-734-A,
1998 WL 724000 (E. D. Va. 1998)).
103
Gov’t Employees Ins. Co.330 F. Supp. 2d at 703–04.
104
Id. at 704.
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[41] Based on this analysis, the court held that GEICO had “sufficiently
alleged that defendants used its marks ‘in commerce.’”105 The court
further rejected Google’s argument for the dismissal of the contributory
and vicarious trademark infringement claims, holding that GEICO had
properly alleged that “the advertisers made ‘use in commerce’ of the
trademarks by using marks as source identifiers in the advertising links
posted on Google’s search results page.”106
(2) GOOGLE, INC. V. AMERICAN BLIND & WALLPAPER FACTORY, INC.
[42] The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California heard a similar case in Google, Inc. v. American Blind &
Wallpaper Factory, Inc.107 Like GEICO, American Blind & Wallpaper
involved trademark claims based upon allegations that Google “sold to
American Blind’s competitors keywords comprised, in whole or part, of
American Blind [trademarks] . . . .”108 Like GEICO, the reported opinion
in American Blind & Wallpaper addressed a motion to dismiss filed by the
defendant “on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to allege an
actionable trademark ‘use.’”109
[43] After reviewing the relevant case law, including U-Haul, Wells
Fargo, and Playboy, the court noted that the state of the law in this area
was “uncertain” and that, under the fairly liberal standard applicable to
motions to dismiss, the court must permit the plaintiff to proceed on its
claims.110 Though the court referenced the liberal standard applicable to
motions to dismiss, it was clearly persuaded by the opinion in Playboy.111
D) 1-800 CONTACTS, INC. V. WHENU.COM, INC.

[44] In June 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit decided 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc. The court
105

Id.
Id. at 705.
107
Google, Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., No. C 03-05340JF, 2005 WL
832398 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2005).
108
Id. at *2.
109
Id. at *4.
110
Id. at *4–5.
111
Id. at *5–6.
106
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reviewed the district court’s granting of plaintiff’s motion for preliminary
injunction against WhenU for the same conduct described in Wells Fargo
and U-Haul.112
[45] Plaintiff alleged that WhenU infringed plaintiff’s trademarks “by
delivering advertisements to Internet users who intentionally accessed the
plaintiff’s website.”113 Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court
granted plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, holding that the
plaintiff had “demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of its
trademark infringement claims.”114 WhenU appealed the district court
decision.115
[46] Once again, the central issue in the court’s determination became
whether WhenU “used” the 1-800 Contacts trademarks within the
meaning of the Lanham Act.116 After reviewing the Lanham Act’s
definition of “use in commerce,” the court reviewed the previous two
WhenU.com decisions, which it found to be “persuasive and
compelling.”117
[47] In stating that WhenU was not “using” the 1-800 Contacts trademarks
in the manner ordinarily associated with an infringement claim, the court
noted that “WhenU does not reproduce or display [the] trademarks at all,
nor does it cause the trademarks to be displayed to a [user]. Rather,
WhenU reproduces 1-800’s website address, www.1800contacts.com,
112

1-800-Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 404 (2d Cir. 2005) (“The
specific conduct at issue in this case has been described in detail by the district court”).
The district court decision can be found at 1-800-Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 309
F. Supp. 2d 467, 476–78 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). As previously discussed, other courts have
also addressed similar claims against WhenU. See Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com,
Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 738–40, 743–46 (E.D. Mich. 2003); U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v.
WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723, 725–36 (E.D. Va. 2003).
113
1-800 Contacts, 414 F.3d at 405.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 406.
116
Id.
117
1-800 Contacts, 414 F.3d at 407–08. The court noted with disapproval that “the
district court’s consideration of these two comprehensive decisions on the precise issue at
hand was confined to a footnote in which it cited the cases, summarized their holdings in
parentheticals, and concluded, without discussion, that it ‘disagree[d] with, and [was] not
bound by these findings.’” Id. at 408.
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which is similar, but not identical, to [the plaintiff’s] 1-800 Contacts
trademark.”118 Though the district court found the differences between 1800 Contacts’ website address and trademark to be insignificant, the
appellate court came to the opposite conclusion, holding that the addition
of “www.” and “.com” to the 1-800 Contacts trademark “transform[ed]
[the] trademark—which is entitled to protection under the Lanham Act—
into a word combination that functions more or less like a public key to 1800’s website.”119
[48] The court further contrasted WhenU’s conduct with the conduct at
issue in GEICO, noting that “WhenU does not disclose the proprietary
contents of the SaveNow directory to its advertising clients nor does it
permit these clients to request or purchase specified keywords to add to
the directory.”120 Accordingly, the court reversed the district court’s
granting of a preliminary injunction, holding that
[a] company’s internal utilization of a trademark in a way
that does not communicate it to the public is analogous to
an individual’s private thoughts about a trademark. Such
conduct simply does not violate the Lanham Act, which is
concerned with the use of trademarks in connection with
the sale of goods or services in a manner likely to lead to
consumer confusion as to the source of such goods or
services.121
E) RECENT CASES

(1) MERCK & CO., INC. V. MEDIPLAN HEALTH CONSULTING, INC.; & EDINA
REALTY, INC. V. THEMLSONLINE, INC.
[49] On March 30, 2006, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York handed down a decision in Merck & Co. Inc. v.

118

Id.
Id. at 408–09.
120
Id. at 409 (citing Gov’t Employee Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 703–
04 (E.D. Va. 2004)).
121
Id. at 409.
119
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Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc.122 The Merck decision is significant not
so much for the actual ruling but because it serves to illustrate the
continuing confusion in the application of trademark law to keyword
advertising. For example, roughly one week before Merck was decided, a
United States District Court in Minnesota came to a conclusion directly
contrary to the Merck court.123
[50] Merck addressed the issue of trademark infringement in keyword
advertising involving Merck & Co., Inc’s blockbuster cholesterol drug
Zocor. Similar to the cases previously discussed, Merck brought suit
against various Canadian online pharmacies for not only using the Zocor
mark and logo (often identifying their products as “generic Zocor”) but
also for purchasing “zocor” as a keyword advertisement from Google and
Yahoo.124 Merck alleged claims of trademark infringement, trademark
dilution, and false advertising. The court held that Merck had stated a
claim for trademark infringement as to most of the defendants based on
their use of the marks on their websites.125 At the same time, the court
rejected the claim that purchasing keywords constituted trademark
infringement on the grounds that keyword purchases are not sufficient to
qualify as a trademark “use.”126 While the court specifically adopted the
1-800 Contacts analysis,127 it went on to acknowledge that the analysis
was inconsistent with the holdings of the Google cases involving GEICO
and American Blind.128 The court concluded by stating that keyword
purchases alone are not an “independent basis for a trademark
infringement claim.”129
[51] Roughly one week before the Merck decision, the United States
District Court for Minnesota came to a contrary conclusion in Edina
122

Merck & Co., Inc. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 402
(S.D.N.Y. 2006).
123
See Edina Realty, Inc. v. TheMLSonline.com, No. Civ. 04-4371JRTFLN, 2006 WL
737064 (D. Minn. Mar. 20, 2006).
124
Merck, 425 F. Supp. 2d at 406.
125
Id. at 410–15.
126
Id. at 415–16.
127
Id. at 415.
128
Id. at 415, n. 9.
129
Id. at 416. Note that the court also held that Merck’s allegations of trademark dilution
were sufficient, however, to survive defendants’ motion to dismiss. Id. at 416–17.
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Realty, Inc. v. TheMLSonline.com.130 While the Merck court relied on the
simple reasoning that keyword purchases are invisible to consumers and
therefore cannot constitute a trademark use “in commerce,”131 the Edina
court ruled that the invisible nature of keyword purchases is irrelevant and
that the purchasing of search terms is a use in commerce under the plain
meaning of the Lanham Act.132 In coming to this conclusion, the Edina
court relied in part on a 1999 decision by the United States Court of the
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in which the appellate court found that
Internet metatags were a use in commerce.133 It is especially important to
note that the Edina decision serves as the first example of a U.S. court
finding that buying competitors’ trademarks as keywords, standing alone,
could constitute a trademark infringement. At the same time, however, the
Merck court, under similar facts, held that buying competitors’ trademarks
as keywords does not constitute trademark infringement. The conflicting
rulings in Merck and Edina highlight the increasing confusion and
discrepancy in keyword purchase case law. If nothing else, these cases
foreshadow the inevitable need for some sort of industry-wide regulation,
congressional action, or judicial standard which may be applied uniformly
to ease some of the confusion for advertisers, search engines, and
consumers.
2. SUMMARY ANALYSIS
[52] Only one thing is certain about the law in this area and that is that the
law is uncertain. The lack of appellate court decisions on this issue and
the incomplete or competing analysis of the district courts who have
addressed the matter make it difficult, though not impossible, to develop
130

Edina Realty, Inc. v. TheMLSonline.com, No. Civ. 04-4371JRTFLN, 2006 WL
737064, at *6 (D. Minn. Mar. 20, 2006). The Edina court held that “[b]ased on the plain
meaning of the Lanham Act, the purchase of search terms is a use in commerce.” Id. at
*3. This case is also important because it appears to be the first case in which a
purchaser’s liability for buying a competitor’s keyword is substantively analyzed. Most
other keyword advertising cases involve search engines as the defendants, not the actual
keyword ad purchaser.
131
See Merck, 425 F. Supp. 2d at 415 (stating that defendants’ invisible and internal
electronic “use of the mark ‘Zocor’ as a key word to trigger the display of sponsored
links is not use of the mark in a trademark sense.”).
132
See Edina, 2006 WL 737064, at *3.
133
Brookfield Comm’cns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1064 (9th Cir.
1999).

25

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XIII, Issue 2

an effective strategy for reducing the risk of trademark liability for
keyword advertisers who purchase competing trademarks.134
A) TRADEMARK USE

[53] Certainly, search engines that use a party’s trademark to sell
advertising and then link that advertising to search results created as a
result of the use of the trademark in an internet search have reason for
concern that their conduct may be considered a “use in commerce” of the
trademark.135 Their concern should be shared equally by the advertisers
who use another’s trademark as a source identifier in the advertising links
posted on a search results page, though the potential exposure may be
reduced or eliminated where the advertiser does not use the trademark as a
source identifier and does not otherwise display the trademark on its
website.136 Such caution may make it difficult for a potential plaintiff to
demonstrate that consumers are likely to be confused by the juxtaposition
of a link to the advertiser’s website, separate from the other links
contained on the search results page, which does not, in any way,
reference the subject trademark.
B) LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

[54] A keyword advertisement that actually uses another’s trademark (or a
substantially similar mark) is certainly more likely to mislead consumers
as to the source of goods or services137 than one that does not make any
reference to the subject mark (or any substantially similar mark).
However, the concept of initial interest confusion provides the trademark
owner with some protection in these instances; the trademark owner’s best
argument under these circumstances is that

134

Though, of course, avoiding the use of trademarks in keyword advertising would
clearly be a safe strategy, it might significantly reduce the effectiveness of such
advertisements.
135
Id. at 407 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000)).
136
Id. at 409.
137
See, e.g., Saunders, supra note 43, at 565 (“[A] clear case of confusion exists if the
competitor’s banner ad actually uses the trademark, or a similar mark or trade name to
trick consumers into thinking that the trademark owner is the source or sponsor of the
ad.”)
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a consumer in search of its product or service would enter
its trademark as a query and that the search engine would
then generate a list of search results above which appears a
[keyword advertisement]. The consumer would either
become confused at that point and, thinking that the . . . ad
was connected with the trademark owner or tempted by the
. . . ad that the consumer assumes was triggered by the
search term, click on the banner ad and be taken to the
competitor’s website where the consumer would find and
purchase a comparable product or service.138
[55] A potential defendant, in responding to such an argument, would be
well-served by noting that keyword advertising causes a banner
advertisement or link to its website to be placed above, or to the side of,
the actual search results generated. 139 Moreover, where a link to the
advertiser’s website is produced, it is placed among a set of links
designated as advertisements or “sponsored links.” Thus, a sophisticated
consumer would be unlikely to be misled as to the sponsorship or source
of the advertised goods or services.
C) PROBABILITY OF DILUTION

[56] In the context of keyword advertising, it may be difficult to establish
a claim for trademark dilution. Where a keyword advertised is set apart
from “ordinary” search results, a defendant may argue that consumers are
unlikely to associate the advertisement with the trademarked search term,
particularly if the advertisements makes no direct reference to the mark
and clearly describes the source of the advertised goods or services.140
Thus, neither theories of blurring nor tarnishment may be compelling.

138

Id. at 565–66.
Id. at 565 (discussing keyword banner advertisements). Though, clearly the likelihood
of confusion is greater for keyword advertising links (or “keyword featured placement
advertising”) than for keyword banner advertising, since the advertising links are
presented in a manner that more closely resembles the “ordinary” search results. Id. at
567.
140
Id. at 571.
139
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D) FAIR USE – COMPARATIVE ADVERTISING

[57] According to at least one commentator, “[K]eyword . . . ads triggered
by trademarks as search terms should be considered a privileged form of
comparative advertising when they allow a firm to offer an alternate
product or service in competition with that of a competitor.”141 This
theory may, indeed, be accurate as long as the triggered advertisement is
non-confusing and non-deceptive.142
IV. LEGAL ISSUES PERTAINING TO ONLINE SALES
A. THE PROBLEM OF WORLDWIDE JURISDICTION
[58] One of the primary advantages of Internet marketing and sales is the
ability to reach potential customers anywhere in the world. Unfortunately
for the online retailer, this reach often works in both directions, so that a
customer in a distant jurisdiction may be able to sue the retailer far from
its base of operations.143 The defense of such a suit naturally begins with
a challenge to personal jurisdiction by the online retailer.
[59] According to relevant case law,
the resolution of a challenge to in personam jurisdiction
involves a two-step inquiry. . . . [First] a court must
determine whether the particular facts and circumstances of
the case fall within the reach of Virginia’s long-arm statute
. . . . Second, the court must determine whether the
exercise of personal jurisdiction would be consistent with

141

Id. at 573.
Id. (noting that such advertisements promote competition and, ultimately, benefit
consumers).
143
See, e.g., Verizon Online Servs., Inc. v. Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d 601 (E.D. Va. 2002)
(“‘the confluence of the “increasing nationalization of commerce” and “modern
transportation and communication”’ carries with it a ‘resulting relaxation of the limits
that the Due Process Clause imposes on courts’ jurisdiction.’”) (quoting World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)).
142

28

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology
the Due Process
Constitution.144

Clause

of

Volume XIII, Issue 2
the

United

States

To survive the jurisdictional challenge, a plaintiff need only
make a prima facie showing of a sufficient jurisdictional
basis on the basis of the complaint and supporting
affidavits. . . . In considering a defendant’s challenge to
personal jurisdiction, a court must construe all relevant
allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and
draw the most favorable inferences for the existence of
jurisdiction.145
1. APPLICATION OF THE VIRGINIA LONG-ARM STATUTE
[60] The Virginia Long-Arm Statute states that,
[a] court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person,
who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action
arising from the person’s . . . [c]ausing injury in this
Commonwealth by an act or omission outside this
Commonwealth if he regularly does or solicits business, or
engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or
derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed
or services rendered in this Commonwealth . . . .146
Analysis under this statute flows naturally into a consideration of the suit’s
compliance with Due Process.

144

Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane S.p.A. v. Casinoalitalia.com, 128 F. Supp. 2d 340, 347
(E.D. Va. 2001) (citing Ellicott Mach. Corp. v. John Holland Party, Ltd., 995 F.2d 474,
477 (4th Cir. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1; Bochan v. LaFontaine, 68 F. Supp. 2d
692, 697–98 (E.D. Va. 1999); DeSantis v. Hafner Creations, Inc., 949 F. Supp. 419, 422
(E.D. Va. 1996)).
145
Rannoch, Inc. v. Rannoch Corp., 52 F. Supp. 2d 681, 684 (E.D. Va. 1999) (citing
Combs v. Bakker, 886 F.2d 673, 676 (4th Cir. 1989)).
146
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1(A)(4) (2006). Note also that the Virginia Code now
specifically provides that “[u]sing a computer or computer network in the
Commonwealth [of Virginia] shall constitute an act in the Commonwealth.” VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-328.1(B) (2006).
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2. DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS
[61] “The Due Process Clause requires that no defendant be haled into
court unless he has ‘certain minimum contacts’ with the forum state such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.’”147
[M]erely because a defendant is aware “that the stream of
commerce may or will sweep the product into the forum
State does not convert the mere act of placing the product
into the stream into an act purposefully directed toward the
Rather, the defendant must have
forum State.”148
“‘purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum state’ . . . to ensure
that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely
as a result of ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’
contacts.149
[62] The determination of whether a court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant can be undertaken through two
different approaches: (1) a consideration of specific jurisdiction, where
jurisdiction is based on the defendant’s contacts with the forum and is
limited specifically and solely to those actions that are the basis of the suit;
or (2) a consideration of general jurisdiction, where the defendant’s
contacts with the forum are systematic and continuous such that the
court’s jurisdiction over the defendant is not limited and need not arise out
of the basis of the suit.150 In addressing the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over a defendant whose contact with the forum state occurs
147

Alitalia-Linee, 128 F. Supp. 2d at 348 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 316 (1945)).
148
Id. at 349 (quoting Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112
(1987)).
149
Id. (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985); World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299 (1987); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v.
Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987)).
150
ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 711–12 (4th Cir.
2002) (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414
(1984); Christian Science Bd. of Dirs. of the First Church of Christ, Scientist v. Nolan,
259 F.3d 209, 216 (4th Cir. 2001)).
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primarily over the Internet, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, and many
other federal courts across the nation, have adopted and adapted the
“sliding scale” approach formulated in Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo
Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).151
[63] In Zippo, the district court described a continuum of three categories
of Internet jurisdiction cases, observing that,
the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be
constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the
nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity
conducts over the Internet. This sliding scale is consistent
with well developed personal jurisdiction principles. At
one end of the spectrum are situations where a defendant
clearly does business over the Internet . . . . At the opposite
end are situations where a defendant has simply posted
information on an Internet Web site which is accessible to
users in foreign jurisdictions . . . . The middle ground is
occupied by interactive Web sites where a user can
exchange information with the host computer.152
The district court concluded that jurisdiction certainly should be exercised
when one proactively enters a jurisdiction via the Internet but that
jurisdiction should not be exercised when one merely passively posts
information on the Internet which may or may not be viewed by residents
of a particular jurisdiction. As to the great masses of cases resting in
“middle ground,” the court held that “the exercise of jurisdiction is
determined by examining the level of interactivity and commercial nature
of the exchange of information that occurs on the website.”153 Thus, some
sort of proactive, purposeful availment must occur on the part of the
website owner in order to be subject to personal jurisdiction.154 Note,
151

ALS Scan, Inc., 293 F.3d at 713–14; Alitalia-Linee, 128 F. Supp. 2d at 349.
Zippo Manuf. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
153
Id.
154
See Carefirst of Maryland, Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Centers, 334 F.3d 390 (4th Cir.
2003) (stating that when a nonresident defendant runs an interactive website, through
which he enters into contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve the
knowing and repeated transmission of computer files over the Internet, he can properly be
hailed into the court of that foreign jurisdiction in accordance with the due process
152
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however, that Virginia is considered a “single act” state, so even a single
sale performed over the Internet may subject a party to personal
jurisdiction in Virginia’s courts.155
A) SPECIFIC JURISDICTION

[64] In considering the issue of specific jurisdiction, courts must consider
(1) the extent to which the defendant “purposely avail[ed]
itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the State;
(2) whether the plaintiffs’ claims arise out of those
activities directed at the State; and (3) whether the exercise
of personal jurisdiction would be constitutionally
“reasonable.”156

clause; however, if by contrast the defendant’s site is passive, in that it merely makes
information available, the site cannot render him subject to specific personal jurisdiction
since merely posting information on the Internet is not enough); Young v. New Haven
Advocate, 315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that posting information on a website
accessible to readers in Virginia does not subject a party to personal jurisdiction in
Virginia unless the Internet postings manifest an intent to target and focus on Virginia
readers); Rannoch, Inc. v. The Rannoch, Corp., 52 F. Supp. 2d 681 (E.D. Va. 1999)
(holding that merely placing information on a website is not enough to subject a party to
a court’s jurisdiction, rather the defendant must have engaged in some purposeful
availment of the jurisdiction). But see Bochan v. LaFontaine, 68 F. Supp. 2d 692 (E.D.
Va. 1999) (stating that jurisdiction is proper where a defendant runs an interactive
website that is accessible in Virginia 24 hours a day to promote and advertise its
products, even though no sales are concluded through the site, because the site offers
product information, company name and telephone numbers, offers no surcharge for
credit card use, and places no geographical limits on purchasers).
155
See Affinity Memory & Micro. v. K&Q Enters., 20 F. Supp. 2d 948 (E.D. Va. 1998)
(holding that a single act amounting to “transacting business” and giving rise to a cause
of action may be sufficient to confer jurisdiction under Virginia Code § 8.01-328.1);
United States v. Pierre Point Shipping & Inv. Co., 655 F. Supp. 1379 (E.D. Va. 1987)
(stating that Virginia Code § 8.01-328.1 is a “single act” statute; and therefore
jurisdiction will exist with respect to a cause of action arising from the business
transaction if by that one act the nonresident can be said to have engaged in some
purposeful activity in Virginia); Nan Ya Plastics Corp. U.S.A. v. DeSantis, 377 S.E.2d
388, 391 (Va. 1989) (“[Virginia’s long arm statute is a] single-act statute requiring only
one transaction in Virginia to confer jurisdiction on our courts”).
156
ALS Scan, 293 F.3d at 712 (citing Christian Science Bd., 259 F.3d at 216;
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414, n. 8).
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[65] In ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Service Consultants, Inc., the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals applied this general concept in the context of a
nonresident defendant who entered the forum state over the Internet. In
that case, the court held,
that a State may, consistent with due process, exercise
judicial power over a person outside of the State when that
person (1) directs electronic activity into the State, (2) with
the manifested intent of engaging in business or other
interactions within the State, and (3) that activity creates, in
a person within the State, a potential cause of action
cognizable in the State’s courts.157
The Fourth Circuit further noted that this “standard for reconciling
contacts through electronic media with standard due process principles”158
is analogous to the “effects test” articulated by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Calder v. Jones159 in that “specific jurisdiction in the
Internet context may be based only on an out-of-state person’s Internet
activity directed at [the forum state] and causing injury that gives rise to a
potential claim cognizable in [the forum state].”160
B) GENERAL JURISDICTION

[66] On the other hand, if the defendant’s contacts with the
State are not also the basis for suit, then jurisdiction over
the defendant must arise from the defendant’s general,
more persistent, but unrelated contacts with the State. To
establish jurisdiction over the defendant, the defendant’s
activities in the State must have been “continuous and
systematic,” a more demanding standard than is necessary
for establishing specific jurisdiction.161

157

ALS Scan, 293 F.3d at 714.
Id.
159
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
160
ALS Scan, 293 F.3d at 714.
161
Id. at 712 (citing Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414, n. 9).
158
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Generally, the suits brought against online retailers and marketers will be
directly related to their electronic contacts with the forum state and,
therefore, the concept of general jurisdiction will rarely need to be
considered. For the purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to note that
general jurisdiction based upon electronic contacts with the forum state
will require much more significant and systematic contacts than would be
required in a specific jurisdiction analysis.
3. ANALYSIS
[67] The potential for nationwide jurisdiction attendant to Internet sales is
a very real threat to small online businesses who would not otherwise
reach a customer base inconveniently distant from their place of business.
An online company that wishes to limit this risk is best served by ensuring
that it is not purposefully availing itself of the privilege of conducting
business activities in an inconveniently distant jurisdiction through its
website. Such a company should not offer products or services directed
to, or useable only by, customers in an inconveniently distant jurisdiction
but should limit the geographic scope of its customer base via a wellcommunicated policy of not filling orders for customers in distant
jurisdictions; such a policy must be well-documented and should appear
throughout the company’s website.
A. DETERMINING THE TERMS OF THE DEAL
1. GENERAL CONTRACT LAW PRINCIPLES
[68] A contract is an agreement, supported by consideration, and arises
when an offer is made by one party and that offer is accepted by
another.162 According to Virginia case law, “Under the objective theory of
contract, which controls in Virginia, an offer has been made if a
reasonable person in the offeree’s position, in view of the offeror’s acts

162

See e.g., Richmond Eng. Corp. & Mfg. v. Loth, 115 S.E. 774, 782–86 (Va. 1923);
Montagna v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 269 S.E.2d 838 (Va. 1980); Chang v. First Colonial
Savings Bank, 410 S.E.2d 928, 931 (Va. 1991).
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and words and the surrounding circumstances, would believe that the
offeror has invited the offeree’s acceptance.”163
[69] Acceptance is defined as the “manifestation of assent164 to the terms
of the offer made by the offeree in a manner invited or required by the
offer.”165 It is the “unconditional promise to be bound by the terms of the
offer” and may be accomplished by conduct or words.166 According to
standard definitions, “The modern test for determining whether there was
acceptance (reflecting the objective theory of contact) is whether it would
be clear to a reasonable person in the position of the offeror that there was
an acceptance.”167
[70] Consideration is defined as “that which is given in exchange for the
agreement” and is “in effect, the price bargained for and paid for the
agreement or promise.”168 Consideration may be the exchange of
currency, property, or promises.
2. ONLINE CONTRACTS
A) TYPES OF ONLINE CONTRACTS

(1) SHRINK-WRAP AGREEMENTS
[71] Software is commonly packaged in a container or
wrapper that advises the purchaser that the use of the
software is subject to the terms of the license agreement
contained inside the package. The license agreement
generally explains that, if the purchaser does not wish to
enter into a contract, he must return the product for a
163

Commonwealth v. Stewart, 66 Va. Cir. 135, 154 (Portsmouth 2004) (citing Chang,
410 S.E.2d at 931; Richmond Eng. Corp., 115 S.E. at 782–86).
164
And, thus, mutual assent of the parties is required. This is often referred to as a
“meeting of the minds.” Id. (citing Marefield Meadows, Inc. v. Lorenz, 427 S.E.2d 363,
365 (Va. 1993)).
165
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 50; 17A AM. JUR. 2D, Contracts
§ 66).
166
Id. (citing Richmond Eng. Corp., 115 S.E. at 786).
167
Id. (citing Green’s Ex’rs v. Smith, 131 S.E. 846, 848–49 (Va. 1926)).
168
Id. (citing Montagna v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 269 S.E.2d 838, 844 (Va. 1980)).
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refund. Failure to return the product within a certain period
constitutes assent to the license terms.169
License agreements of this sort are often referred to as shrink-wrap
agreements because of the shrink-wrap packaging surrounding most retail
software. Such contracts are generally enforceable and courts have held
that similar agreements “can bind users of a website, for instance, if notice
is provided that continuing to explore a website or purchase of an item
binds the party to an agreement located elsewhere on the website (for
example, in the terms and conditions of use).”170
(2) CLICK-WRAP AGREEMENTS
[72] Often, the user of a commercial website is asked to read a set of terms
and conditions governing the activities conducted on that site and then
presented with two options: (1) agreeing to the terms and conditions, or
(2) refusing to agree to the terms and conditions. Typically, the user must
agree to the terms and conditions to make a purchase or obtain the service
offered by the website. Agreements entered into in this fashion are
referred to as “click-wrap” agreements because the user typically indicates
his or her agreement to the terms and conditions by clicking a button or
hyperlink marked “I agree.”171 Generally, courts that have addressed the
issue have found click-wrap agreements to be binding, subject to the
traditional notions of fair dealing that make unconscionable agreements
unenforceable172
169

JONATHAN D. ROBBINS, ADVISING EBUSINESSES § 8-2.40, n. 2.50 (2006).
Id.
171
Id. (“For example, when a visitor to Netscape’s website desires to download certain
software, a webpage appears containing the full text of the license agreement governing
the download and use of that software. Plainly visible on the screen is a question: Do
you accept all the terms of the preceding agreement? If so, click on the Yes button. If
you select No, you will not be able to download the software. Unless the user clicks
‘Yes,’ indicating his consent to be bound by the agreement the user cannot download the
software.”).
172
Id. (citing Register.Com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004); i-Systems,
Inc. v. Softwares, Inc., No. Civ. 02-1951JRTFLN, 2004 WL 742082, at *6 (D. Minn.
Mar. 29, 2004); Davidson & Assocs., Inc. v. Internet Gateway, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d
1164 (E.D. Mo. 2004); DeJohn v. TV Corp. Intl., 245 F. Supp. 2d 913 (C.D. Ill. 2003);
Siedle v. National Ass’n. of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 2d 1140 (M.D. Fla. 2002);
Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d, 306
170
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(2) BROWSE-WRAP AGREEMENTS
[73] In some instances, websites contain terms and conditions which
purport to bind any user who visits the website without any other
manifestation of assent by the visitor.
Notice of the [terms and conditions] usually appears on
the home page [but] . . . [t]he user is not required to click
on an icon expressing agreement to the terms of the
agreement (as is the case of click-wrap agreements), nor
is the user ever required to view the terms (as in the case
of shrink-wrap agreements).173
Because such agreements lack an affirmative action indicating assent by
the website visitor, many courts are reluctant to enforce them.174
B) DIGITAL SIGNATURES AND THE UNIFORM ELECTRONIC
TRANSACTIONS ACT

[74] Virginia has enacted a set of laws dealing with electronic commerce
called the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (“UETA”).175 UETA does
not change any substantive contract law, but rather provides procedural
rules for conducting electronic transactions.176
[75] UETA is designed to support the use of electronic media to conduct
transactions between parties.177 The term commerce, as used in the
UETA, is to be interpreted broadly, so that all sorts of transactions,
F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002); Caspi v. Mcrosoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528 (N.J. App. Div.
1999); Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie Inc, No. C-98JWPVTENE, 1998 WL 388389
(N.D. Cal. 1998)); see also William J. Condon, Jr., Electronic Assent to Online
Contracts: Do Courts Consistently Enforce Clickwrap Agreements?, 16 REGENT U. L.
REV. 433, 434 (2004).
173
JONATHAN D. ROBBINS, ADVISING EBUSINESS § 8-2.40, n. 2.50 (2006).
174
Id. at n. 11.50 (citing Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974 (E.D. Cal.
2000)). Some jurisdictions, however, do enforce such agreements. Id. at n. 11 (citing
Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d as modified,
356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004)).
175
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-479 to 59.1-497 (2006).
176
VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-479, cmt. A (2006).
177
VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-480, cmt. 12 (2006).
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executed electronically, may fall under the purview of this code section.178
The gravitas of UETA is found in Virginia Code § 59.1-485, which
provides that:
(a) A record or signature may not be denied legal effect or
enforceability solely because it is in electronic form; (b) a
contract cannot be denied legal effect or enforceability
solely because it was formed using electronic means . . . (c)
an electronic writing satisfies the statute of frauds, or any
other law requiring a writing; and (d) an electronic
signature satisfies [any] law requiring a signature.179
[76] UETA defines “electronic record” as “a record created, generated,
sent, communicated, received, or stored by electronic means.”180 UETA
defines “electronic signature” as an “electronic sound, symbol, or process
associated with a record and executed or adopted by a person with the
intent to sign the record.”181 This definition includes the “standard
webpage click through process. . . . When a person orders goods online,
gets to the last step and clicks on ‘I agree,’ that person has adopted the
process and has done so with the apparent intent of receiving goods,
thereby being bound to pay for them.”182 By clicking on “I agree,” the
person has provided an electronic signature assenting to the transaction,
per the terms of this statute.183
[77] Many other states have enacted legislation either identical, or
substantially similar, to UETA in their respective jurisdictions.184 The
178

Id.
VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-485(a)–(d) (2006).
180
VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-480(7) (2006).
181
VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-480(8) (2006).
182
Id. at cmt. 7.
183
Id.
184
See ALA. CODE §§ 8-1A-1 to 8-1A-20 (2002); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 25-32-101 to 25-32121 (2002); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1633.1 to 1633.17 (WEST 2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.6, §§
12A-101 to 12A-117 (2005); FLA. STAT. § 668.50 (2005); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 489E-1
to 489E-19 (2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 28-50-101 to 28-50-120 (2005); IND. CODE §§
26-2-8-101 to 26-2-8-302 (2005); IOWA CODE §§ 554D.101 to 554D.123 (2005);
KENTUCKY REVISED STAT. ANN. §§ 369.101 to 369.120 (2002); MAINE REV. STAT ANN.
tit. 10, §§ 9401 to 9419 (2005); MD. CODE ANN. COM LAW §§ 21-101 to 21-120 (WEST
2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS. §§ 450-831 to 450.849 (2002); MINN. STAT. §§ 325L.01 to
179
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impact of this code section on internet click through agreements is
noteworthy. For example, let us assume that a consumer visits a web site
and purchases $600.00 worth of sporting goods by entering all of his
pertinent information into an electronic order form and clicking on “I
Agree” at the end of the transaction. Under traditional contract law, this
type of contract must be in writing and signed by the party to be charged,
as it is a sale of goods exceeding $500.00.185 With the advent of UETA,
this electronic transaction satisfies the statute of frauds, as the electronic
order form would constitute a writing under UETA and the person would
have signed the agreement by clicking on the “I Agree” icon.186
C) DOCUMENTATION

[78] The World Wide Web is a fluid medium. Commercial websites
change frequently, sometimes even on a weekly or daily basis, as new
products and services are offered and new terms and conditions are
applied to sales. The online contract that applies to a sale on a company’s
website today may not have the same terms as the online contract that
applied last month or last year.
[79] A company that does not properly document and retain its website
content as it changes over time runs the substantial risk of being unable to
prove the precise contractual terms applicable to a specific transaction.
Such a company may be unable to prove a claim for non-payment and
may be unable to fully defend a suit brought by a customer. In particular,
online contracts by which a customer agrees to bring claims in an agreed
upon forum, provide warranty terms or conditions of sale, or limit the
online retailer’s liability in scope or amount of damages provide vital
protections to the online business. Without the ability to establish the
325L.19 (2004); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 75-12-1 to 75-12-39 (2004); MONT. CODE ANN. §§
30-18-101 to 30-18-118 (2005); NEB. REV. ST. §§ 86-612 to 86-643 (2005); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 294-E:1 to 294-E:20(WEST 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 12A:12-1 to
12A:12-25 (WEST 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 66-311 to 66-330 (2002); OHIO REV. CODE.
ANN. §§ 1306.01 to 1306.23 (2002); OKL. STAT. tit. 12A, §§ 15-101 to 15-120 (2002); R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 42-127.1-1 to 42-107.1-20 (2005); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§
43.001 to 43.021 (2002); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-4-101 to 46-4-503 (2005); W. VA. CODE
§§ 39A-1-1 to 39A-1-17 (2004); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-21-101 to 40-21-119 (2005).
185
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-201 (2001).
186
VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-480(7)–(8) (2001).
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exact terms of a specific transaction, sometimes years later, the online
business runs a risk of catastrophic loss.187
V. CONCLUSION
[80] The Internet provides many new sales and marketing opportunities,
though these new opportunities are coupled with significant risks. Online
businesses must adapt to this changing commercial environment. Just as
the online medium has changed the sales and marketing techniques of
these online retailers, it must also alter the legal strategy and advice of
their counsel. Failure to adapt in this way will reduce the efficiency of the
Internet as a commercial medium or, worse still, lead to the demise of an
unwary business.188

187

A company runs a similar risk of catastrophic loss where it fails to properly document
and retain the changing content of its copyrighted website text and images. As the United
States Copyright Office has recognized, “[m]any works transmitted online are revised or
updated frequently.” U.S. Copyright Office Circular 66. Federal copyright registration
of an online work, such as a commercial website, requires the owner to be able to identify
the precise content to be protected. Similarly, the enforcement of an owner’s rights in a
copyrighted work, whether it is federally registered or not, requires the owner to be able
to establish the precise content owned. Without a method of regularly documenting and
retaining website content, an online business risks being unable to document or enforce
its rights in a copyrighted work.
188
Any information contained herein is not intended to be a substitute for legal counsel on
any subject matter. No recipients of these materials should act or refrain from acting on
the basis of any information contained herein without seeking appropriate legal advice.
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